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Abstract Learning about biological evolution presents
particular challenges for students. Barriers to learning come
in the form of students’ prior conceptions that conflict with
the scientific perspective of biological change. Theory and
research from developmental and educational psychology
provide insight into these barriers. Helping students
understand evolution is not simply a matter of adding to
their existing knowledge, but rather, it means helping them
to see the world in new and different ways. Theoretical
perspectives on creating change in students’ conceptions
have implications for teaching about biological evolution.
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The theories of evolutionary science challenge educators
and learners for many reasons, not the least of which is that
thinking about evolutionary processes requires us to
approach the world in a different way than we do in
everyday life. Research from several specialties within
psychology has demonstrated that when we are faced with a
new or surprising situation, we rely on some basic assump-
tions to simplify affairs and find a workable explanation. From
infancy on, these shortcuts are extremely helpful in learning
about and navigating the world most of the time; unfortu-
nately, they do come at a cost—when we are faced with cases
that do not fit our assumptions, we make errors and arrive at
serious misconceptions. Evolution is one of these cases.
Our goal in this paper is to describe some of the
obstacles that commonsense reasoning throws in our path
when we try to think about evolution. Most of this research
is in very early stages; no one has anything remotely
resembling a cure-all answer to these challenges. However,
perhaps we do know enough to help educators recognize
seemingly odd or bullheaded thinking as clues to very
powerful (and fascinating!) psychological processes that
can allow us to get inside the learners’ heads and better
understand why they are resistant or seem unable to grasp
basic concepts such as natural selection, random variation,
and speciation. We will also report on how the most current
research is working to develop more effective tools and
curricula in the future.
The barriers to understanding evolution to be discussed
here all arise because people have certain ways of looking
at and thinking about the world, or, to put it another way,
certain conceptions of the world. Helping people to
understand evolution, then, is not a matter of adding on to
their existing knowledge, but helping them to revise their
previous models of the world to create an entirely new way
of seeing. Psychologists refer to this type of learning as
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conceptual change. Conceptual change is necessary for
some students to understand evolution, but it is also
extremely difficult.
The challenges to conceptual change can be roughly
divided into three categories: basic constraints that are
present from infancy and early childhood, experiences that
reinforce our default ways of thinking, and emotional and
motivational reactions that make us reluctant to entertain
the possibility of change.
Developmental Constraints as a Barrier
to Conceptual Change
The term “conceptual change” is often attributed to the
philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) description
of theory change in science that occurs during a paradigm
shift, but psychologists often trace the notion of conceptual
change to Piaget, a philosopher and biologist who is also
considered the father of developmental psychology. Inter-
estingly for us, too, his insights can be closely tied to his
work as a biologist and his own studies of the interaction of
genes and environment in mollusks. Childhood develop-
ment, for Piaget, was a process analogous to evolution—the
basic building blocks of thinking and learning provided a
child with the ability to adapt to specific environmental
pressures and affordances. In the case of the child, however,
there is an important distinction—the actual process is not
an evolutionary one, because the child is actively making
choices.
Piaget provided psychologists with two important
themes for understanding conceptual change. The first is
the difference between assimilation and accommodation.
Assimilation described the process of adding new informa-
tion to knowledge structures that remained relatively
unaltered. Students can come to a learning situation with
little prior knowledge or with knowledge that is consistent
with the new situation; learning in this case is an additive
process, and relatively easy. (Of course, it can still be
difficult, as any parent who has had to help their child learn
multiplication or all of the state capitals can attest!)
However, there are many situations where students are
exposed to new ideas that directly conflict with what
they already know. Piaget (1952) called the process of
modifying existing knowledge structures to incorporate
new information “accommodation.” In these cases, altering
the basic structure of their knowledge is necessary for
success.
The second theme that Piaget gave psychologists was the
idea that infants and children are not empty vessels that just
get filled with information. We start life with default ways
of making sense of the world that are biologically based;
these are one set of shortcuts that allow us to learn about
the world much more effectively than we would if we had
to learn everything from scratch. Assimilation can occur
relatively easily when the world matches with our default
assumptions; accommodation is necessary when we have to
move to a different way of seeing the world.
Much research has been done since Piaget, and the
specifics of his underlying theory—what a child could learn
when—have been substantially revised. An enduring
legacy, however, is his fundamental insight that children
are complex, active, and remarkably sophisticated learners.
Through elegant and cleverly designed studies, develop-
mental psychologists have since shown that even in infancy
we possess several extremely powerful “rules of thumb”
that shape our thinking (Wellman and Gelman 1998), and
make learning about evolution very challenging, because
evolution does not operate according to these rules (Evans
2000, 2001). These rules, often called “cognitive con-
straints” or “cognitive biases” are what we are calling the
essentialist constraint, the teleological constraint, and the
intentionality constraint.
The essentialist constraint Essentialism is the tendency for
children to believe that things belong to categories because
they have an underlying nature that we cannot see, but that
gives things of that sort their basic identity (Gelman 2003).
Moreover, this essence is immutable—a bird cannot
become a dog, and a boy cannot become a girl. Although
this essentialist tendency is most pronounced in children,
we adults also tend to think this way, especially when we
are pressured for time, have a lot on our minds, or
encounter something unusual. It is no surprise, then, that
people find evolution—changing from one kind of organ-
ism into another—highly implausible. And, even if we are
willing to accept that this can happen, our minds are really
not set up to think this way; wanting to see the world
through the lens of evolution alone does not make it easy.
The teleological constraint Children also take the position
that things are made for a purpose (Kelemen 1999).
Teleology, a term attributed to Aristotle, is the attribution
of design and purpose to nature and to human creations,
and can be contrasted with naturalism, the philosophical
stance in which science is today grounded. Children are like
young Aristotles—they tend to believe that animals have
eyes because they need to see, and birds have wings
because they need to fly. Such thinking persists in adults,
although as adults we tend to apply such explanations mostly
to living things or complex artifacts (such as computers),
whereas children of elementary school age can be heard to
make claims such as rocks are pointy to protect themselves
from being smashed by animals (Kelemen 1999).
Clearly then, children and even adults are more likely to
find design-based accounts of living things much more
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plausible and in keeping with their world view than an
evolutionary account.
The intentionality constraint Teleological reasoning is
closely related to the intentionality constraint—the tenden-
cy to assume that events are not only purposeful but that
they may be caused by an intentional agent, an agent with a
“mind of its own.” This makes creationist or intelligent
design views very appealing and easily acquired (Evans
2000, 2001, 2008), which not only dovetails perfectly with
the developmental biases of essentialism and teleology but
also reinforces these intuitive cognitive biases.
Psychologists continue to debate the precise timing,
course, and extent of these constraints, but it is fairly well
accepted that they do exist, and that they encourage us to
see our world as unchanging, orderly, and commonsensical.
Children’s understanding of their own and others’ mental
states (called theory of mind) follows a clear developmental
trajectory; by 3 to 5 years of age they understand the beliefs
of others can be false (Wellman and Gelman 1998) and by
the middle to late elementary school years, they can reason
about complex mental states such as intentions and desires
with relative ease. This later capacity makes it possible to
contemplate existential questions, such as how and why do
living things come into existence; the kinds of questions
that are at the very heart of the debate about origins (Evans
2001, 2008).
Some have even argued that naïve theories or folk
theories are, in fact, evolutionary adaptations of our own
(Geary 2006). According to this view, humans have
evolved mechanisms that lead to successful functioning in
the world, but not for learning about abstract academic
domains such as quantum physics or linear algebra.
Moreover, resistance to changing one’s ideas is adaptive;
having to reconsider every prior assumption and decision
could be paralyzing and endanger one’s survival. What
exasperates science educators may be central to our
evolutionary fitness.
Prior Knowledge as a Barrier to Conceptual Change
In addition to developmental constraints, the experiences
that children have with the world further entrench their
intuition, and cause them to develop particular ideas about
how the world works. Both of these factors make it difficult
to adopt new, more scientifically accurate ones. These
intuitions, also referred to as naïve theories or framework
theories, provide simple explanations for natural phe-
nomena that work well in everyday life, even if they are
not entirely accurate from a scientific standpoint (Wellman
and Gelman 1998). For example, children’s everyday
experience of the earth is that of a flat stationary surface.
The notion of the earth being a giant ball floating in space
belies this experience and requires radical restructuring. It is
interesting that such restructuring often goes through shifts
that involve the construction of alternative conceptions of
the earth shape, or “synthetic models” (Vosniadou and
Brewer 1992). For example, a child may confidently claim
that there are two earths, the one we live on, which is flat
and stable, and the one up in the sky that is round and in
motion.
We also develop beliefs about living things, inheritance,
and change through experience. The idea of framework
theories in the area of biology has its roots in early work by
Susan Carey (1985). Since then, Carey and others have
documented a number of misconceptions that young
children hold, suggesting that until a child is 8–10 years
of age, they do not have sufficient knowledge of the world
to have an adequate account of concepts such as inheri-
tance, lineage, and biological change.
Sometimes a child’s misconceptions are difficult to
uncover. For example, a 4- or 5-year-old knows that
offspring resemble their parents, suggesting that they have
a good idea of how inheritance works. However, they
believe this resemblance will hold even if the child is
adopted. It is not until they are 7 or 8 that they understand
that some forms of parentage provide for inheritance and
others do not (Solomon et al. 1996). These researchers
would argue that those early developmental biases like
essentialism are there, but until a child has certain
knowledge—in this case, an understanding of birth
(Johnson and Solomon 1997)—they think that essence
can be passed by being a parent, regardless of how one
came to be a parent.
As in the case of adoptive versus biological parents,
some of these misconceptions tend to dissipate on their own
as a child learns more about the world. But in some cases, it
may be that experience consistently fails to provide the
information we need to realize we are making a mistake.
According to the cognitive scientist Micki Chi, this is one
reason that evolution is so difficult for students to
understand—we make errors, but they fit neatly with our
existing understanding of the world, so we fail to see them
as errors, and we are naturally reluctant to rethink our
misconceptions (see also Evans 2000, 2001, 2008).
The most serious of these errors are those that require an
ontological shift to fix them. Chi uses the idea of ontologies
here to underscore that the shift requires a change in the
nature of one’s reality (Ferrari and Chi 1998). For example,
we might mistake a whale for a fish; this is a misconcep-
tion, but we do not have to radically change our way of
looking at the world to fix it—we do have to accept that
some mammals live in water, a considerable surprise, no
doubt. However, our ideas about animals and fish and
mammals can stay fairly much the same.
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Lateral shifts in knowledge are much more challenging.
These require crossing boundaries between what Chi calls
“ontologically distinct categories.” A shift from thinking of
something as inanimate to thinking of it as animate would
be one example; others include shifting from viewing
a psychological state as a physical state to recognizing it as
a mental state, and shifting from seeing something as a
clearly bounded event to seeing it as a process. All require
radical rethinking of what we know and believe, and there
is little to help us in making such a shift because our most
basic assumptions and most familiar ways of thinking and
talking are no longer valid. For example, it makes no sense
to talk about a memory in terms of color, length, or weight
as we would a physical object; discovering that a plant is a
living thing requires accepting an entirely new set of
assumptions, expectations, and explanations. Not only is
such change difficult, it is hard for learners to even accept
that such a thing is possible—it is so much easier and more
sensible to retain an understanding of plants as inanimate
objects, for example.
Evolution, Chi argues, is a phenomenon that requires
just such a shift, making it particularly vexing to students.
In particular, natural selection is an emergent process,
involving a long period of time and many different,
independent organisms; students, however, come to the
study of evolutionary biology thinking about changes in
species as an event rather than a process. An event is neatly
bounded, with a clear beginning, middle, and end that can
be counted on to occur in a certain order—a baseball game
or a graduation ceremony are examples of events. A
process is ongoing, contingent on multiple factors, and
without clear start and finish. Thinking about evolution as
an event causes many problems. The variation necessary for
natural selection to occur does not exist in the event model,
nor does differential survival and reproduction. Inheritance
is an uncomplicated “handing over” of a genetic blueprint
from parent to child (not unlike the handing over of a
diploma!). Furthermore, change is not gradual and cumu-
lative, but the result of a single event that completely alters
the species. Not surprisingly, this event version of evolution
is difficult to swallow, and if students do try to apply it,
their explanations will be filled with errors.
Emotion and Motivation as a Barrier
to Conceptual Change
Educational psychologists and those in the learning
sciences focus on theoretical models that attempt to explain
the learning process in general. Traditionally, they focused
their efforts on describing cognitive mechanisms and did
not address the complex of affective characteristics such as
attitudes, beliefs, motives, and emotions that educational
researchers observed so often in classrooms and other
learning contexts. Since the revolutionary article of Pintrich
et al. (1993) called for an inclusion of motivational
constructs into models of conceptual change, there have
been an increasing number of researchers characterizing
conceptual change as social, contextual, motivational, and
affective in nature (see, for example, Dole and Sinatra
1998; Gregoire 2003; Murphy and Mason 2006). There
has also been more research into the ways in which learn-
ing science affects students emotionally, culturally, and
personally.
For example, there have been a number of anecdotal
reports that evolutionary theory is emotionally and personal-
ly unpleasant for some students to contemplate. In Unweav-
ing the Rainbow, Richard Dawkins recounts that:
A foreign publisher of my first book confessed that he
could not sleep for three nights after reading it, so
troubled was he by what he saw as its cold, bleak
message. Others have asked me how I can bear to get
up in the mornings. A teacher from a distant country
wrote to me reproachfully that a pupil had come to
him in tears after reading the same book, because it
had persuaded her that life was empty and purposeless.
(Dawkins 1998, pg. ix)
We might not put too much stock in such anecdotes, but
more systematic studies of people’s beliefs about evolution
are remarkably consistent with such tales. Brem et al.
(2003) surveyed undergraduates regarding their perceptions
of the “consequences” of believing in evolution. Would
accepting evolutionary theory cause people to become more
or less racist, selfish, and purposeful? Would it cause them
to believe more or less in spirituality and self-determination?
They were surprised to find that both students who accepted
evolutionary theory and those who did not reported very
similar beliefs regarding these issues; both groups thought
that belief in evolution would make people more racist and
selfish, less able to accept the spiritual, and reduce their
sense of purpose and self-determination. Even more
surprising, in a follow-up study with high school biology
teachers, Griffith and Brem (2004) found that even teachers
worried about such matters, and some experienced clini-
cally measurable levels of stress when just thinking about
teaching evolution. They handled their worries in various
ways, but in many cases, their strategies reduced their
ability to discuss evolution with students and listen to
students’ concerns.
Psychologists Lisa Linnenbrink-Garcia and Kevin Pugh
(who is also a geologist) have been looking for ways to use
affect and motivation to enhance learning about evolution
(Pugh et al., under review). In particular, they are looking for
what Dewey called “the transformative experience,” learning
that does not simply add to what a student knows, but
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enriches everyday experience and causes them to restructure
those experiences. Although they have so far found transfor-
mative experiences to be rare, they have noted that a mastery
orientation—the goal of learning for learning’s sake—seems
to be conducive to conceptual change. In addition, a sense of
identity as a science student might also be helpful.
Putting it All Together: Models of Conceptual Change
One way of thinking about conceptual change is to connect
the process that individual learners undergo with historical
scientific revolutions—a popular approach in the 1970s and
1980s. These theorists worked from the perspective that
individual conceptual change “recapitulates” the historical
conceptual change that occurred within a discipline. They
focused on similarities between the process of scientific
revolutions as described by Kuhn (1970) and the knowl-
edge change process as experienced by individual science
learners.
One of the most influential models of conceptual change
learning emerged from educators’ attempts to promote
“scientific revolutions” in the thinking of young learners
(Posner et al. 1982; Strike and Posner 1992). Noting the
strong resistance of learners to adopting scientific modes of
thought even with the best efforts of instruction, Posner et
al. (1982) described the conditions necessary to effect
change in science students’ thinking. First, learners must
become dissatisfied with their existing conceptions, just as
scientists must become disillusioned with their own
theoretical perspective before they consider alternatives. In
addition, the learner must come to see the new explanation
as intelligible (easily understood), plausible (credible), and
fruitful (useful for explaining other phenomena), drawing
their criteria from studies of what causes scientific
communities to adopt a new theory.
Beyond these more “intellectual” obstacles, students are
often motivated by their belief systems and cultural identity
to remain true to their current conceptions. Strong emo-
tional and personal reactions to scientific perspectives led
Strike and Posner (1992) to later revise their theory of
conceptual change to acknowledge the differences between
change in an individual learner and the self-correcting
process of knowledge change in the scientific community.
Emotions and motivation are now recognized as critical or
even determinative of the likelihood of change (Sinatra and
Pintrich 2003). Although such models can predict human
conceptual change in some instances, they do not capture
emotional attachment to a theory, fear of losing one’s
personal identity, or other motives for wanting to hold to
one theory over another. One model, Dole and Sinatra’s
(1998) Cognitive Reconstruction of Knowledge Model
(CRKM) can be used to illustrate the recent general trend.
The CRKM describes the learning situation as a complex
interaction between the content and the learner. For
example, the instructional content must be perceived by
the learner as coherent, plausible, and comprehensible, as
Posner et al. (1982) described. Next, the CRKM describes
how the learner’s existing knowledge will affect the
probability that change will occur. If the learner’s existing
conception is coherent and deeply interconnected with
other ideas they hold, the likelihood of change decreases.
Change is also less likely if the learner is deeply committed
to their existing point of view, even if it is not well con-
nected to other ideas. Personal relevance of the content
stemming from interest, emotional involvement, self-efficacy,
and having a stake in the outcome of a dispute between two
positions is also described as playing a determinative role in
change. Other motivating factors include the social context;
for example, students are more likely to engage with an idea if
their peers show an interest.
Most important to the CRKM is the notion of the
engagement continuum. Dole and Sinatra (1998) hypothe-
sized that the low level of cognitive engagement needed to
successfully complete many instructional activities requir-
ing only superficial, surface-level processing and little
reflection is not likely to result in significant conceptual
change. For change to occur, the tasks must promote deep
processing, elaborative strategy use and reflection.
The CRKM can be applied to understand challenges
encountered by students learning about biological evolu-
tion. Specifically, if students have deeply entrenched
alternative conceptions about biological “kinds” as static
and immutable, they are less likely to engage with a
message about the continuous gradual change in organisms
evolutionary biologists describe. So, understanding the
background students bring to their studies is important. If
students do not view the topic of natural selection as
personally relevant because the content is not connected to
their personal lives, they are less likely to experience
change. This fits well with the call for evolution educators
to make the topic more personally relevant for students by
explaining why they must take a full course of antibiotics or
how ideas from evolution are used in developing treatments
for diseases (see, for example, Hillis 2007). The CRKM
predicts that if the instructional design of the content does
not require the high engagement required by discussion,
debate, argumentation, experimentation, and the juxtaposi-
tion of ideas, little change will result.
What Can We Do to Foster Conceptual Change?
First and foremost, we can appreciate that learning about a
complex process like evolution, which likely conflicts with
students’ prior experiences, background knowledge, and
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perhaps personal beliefs, most probably requires conceptual
change. As changing our conceptions is always difficult, we
should expect then, that evolution will be difficult for many
students to learn.
Understanding the sources of conflict and resistance to
evolution and the challenges of fostering change on this
topic is a next step to developing successful approaches to
evolution instruction. Students come with entrenched ideas
and ways of viewing the world that are in conflict with
scientific perspectives such as species change, deep time,
and difficult-to-observe phenomena, such as genetic drift.
Conceptual change research suggests that educators must
be aware of students’ preconceived ideas that they bring
to the classroom, and must design instruction to give
students the opportunity to think deeply about alternative
perspectives.
Next, there are some instructional strategies that we can
adopt. At this point, they are not necessarily tested
strategies, but they do address one or more aspects of the
conceptual difficulties exhibited by children and adults.
One strategy is to focus on the language of evolution
(Evans 2008). As described earlier, children are adept at
utilizing the language of mental states, and when educators
and writers use intentional language they are likely to elicit
this conceptual framework. By anthropomorphizing evolu-
tion, educators may succeed in arousing students’ interest,
but at the expense of their scientific understanding. This is
especially problematic in the case of evolution, where terms
such as design, need, theory, and adaptation have an
everyday and a scientific meaning. Evolutionary biologists
use these everyday terms in a highly specialized manner or
metaphorically, but the language provides traps for the
unwary. One solution is to make students aware of this
conflict and to challenge them to provide examples of the
intentional use of adaptation (for example) as well as its use
by evolutionary biologists: Did ants adapt to their changed
environment because (1) they wanted to do so and decided
to change, or (2) because some ants possessed a particular
trait that was advantageous in that environment? Such a
strategy may have another benefit. By divorcing the
language of evolution from the language of intentionality,
the educator is less likely to invoke the emotions that
accompany mental state explanations.
Another strategy is to connect topics in biological
evolution to students’ everyday experiences, such as dis-
cussing genetically modified food and antibiotic-resistant
bacteria (see Hillis 2007 for example). Conceptual change
research and theory suggest that students are more
motivated to attend to content they see as personally
relevant (Dole and Sinatra 1998). Have students try to
imagine what our lives would be like without an under-
standing of evolution—we would be unable to develop
drugs that successfully treat common childhood illness such
as ear infections and strep throat, or to develop disease- or
insect-resistant crops, or to breed less aggressive dogs that
make good pets, etc. When evolution is connected to
aspects of students’ daily lives, they are more likely to see
the relevance and be more motivated to work toward
developing understanding of the complexities of the
content.
Finally, conceptual change is more likely to occur when
students can experience the phenomena directly. In class,
experiments using fruit flies or cross-fertilization of plants
capitalize on children’s natural curiosity and allow oppor-
tunities for observations that are compelling. Conceptual
change research suggests that the degree of engagement
(Dole and Sinatra 1998), that is, how deeply students
become involved in the content through discussion, debate,
dialog, and/or experimentation, relates to the likelihood of
change.
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